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Background: In the evaluation process, it is not 
only the organising of different views and action 
plans so as to reach the mutual understanding that 
advances evaluation utilization through 
argumentation. It is above all complicated to 
compose a framework that can ensure clear 
guidelines for ethical evaluation practice in 
specific contextual situations and in complex 
operational environment with conflicting role 
expectations. 
 
Purpose: The aim of this article is to suggest 
guidelines for ethical reflection in evaluation 
practice in multiactor networks. For this purpose, 
we study the normative features of the use of 
language, illustrate the complexity of ethical 
decision-making, and discuss the importance of 
professional virtues in ethical reflection.  
 
Setting: Not applicable. 
 
Subjects: Not applicable. 
 
Research Design: Not applicable. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis: Desk review. 
Findings: The results indicate that from speech 
acts it may be impossible either to logically derive 
moral duties or obligations to act, or to present 
idealising suppositions of such rules for dialogical 
situations as would ensure the production of 
universal norms for participants in a conversation. 
However, the argumentation process is fruitful 
expressly when the participants can set mutual 
understanding as a goal and commit to aspire to 
that goal—although it will be impossible to reach it 
perfectly in practice. The use of neither extensive 
principles nor reflection on several theories can 
ensure a clear view of the situation.  
 
Conclusions: The ethics of evaluation is mostly 
concerned with balancing the conflicting 
principles and values. Therefore in ethical 
reflection, the focus should be on commitment to a 
certain reflective professional way of life in which 
the identification and acquirement of professional 
virtues have an important role. 
 








valuation and evaluators have an 
important role in the choice of the 
public-policy instruments by which 
governmental authorities wield their 
power attempting to ensure support and 
to effect social change (e.g. Bemelmans-
Videc & Vedung, 1998). The pressures 
around evaluations have increased 
because of their greater impact. The 
protocol and procedures of the 
evaluations have not, however, enough 
developed to meet these challenges. 
(Temmes, 2004) In the governmental 
evaluation markets the evaluators, are 
acting in complex operational 
environment, multiactor networks, where 
they have to meet conflicting or different 
preconceived notions about their roles 
(Laitinen, 2008) and to cooperate in order 
to reconcile the multiple points of view, 
traditions and interests; to resolve 
eventual conflicts in interactional context 
(Huotari, 2009). 
In this article, the complex nature of 
evaluation practice in multiactor networks 
is the starting point of the sketching of 
guidelines for ethical reflection. For this 
purpose we firstly discuss the question 
whether the use of language has 
normative features through Searle’s and 
Habermas’ approaches. Then the 
complexity of ethical decision-making is 
illustrated through Newman and Brown’s 
model. Finally, the importance of 
professional virtues in ethical reflection is 





From an argumentative perspective, 
evaluation consists of different kinds of 
statements, which become matters of 
individual interpretation, collective 
argumentation and decision making in 
interactional contexts. The reasoning 
process in evaluation produces arguments 
that are communicated as text and speech 
for evaluation users. These arguments 
then become part of the social processes 
of discussion, dialogue and negotiations, 
which may lead to decisions and other 
kinds of effects (Valovirta, 2002). 
According to Valovirta (2002) an 
evaluation utilization process comprises 
four phases (see Figure 1): first, people 
participate in an evaluation process and 
read the evaluation reports, the substance 
of which they interpret on their own. The 
presented arguments are re-evaluated, 
leading to new and transformed 
comprehensions, confirmation of existing 
beliefs, or they are refuted. In policy 
making and organizational action, these 
individual interpretations also become the 
subject of collective deliberation and 
decision making, where argumentation 
by persuasion, legitimization, criticism 
and defense play the central role. Finally, 
these interactions may result in decisions 
and actions, new shared understandings 










Figure 1. The Utilization Process of Evaluation 
 
 
Communication is an essential 
element in the evaluation process. 
Therefore, from ethical perspective, the 
question of the illocutionary force of 
utterances is important: does the use of 
language itself have normative features. 
The study of the approaches of Searle and 
Habermas, however, indicate that from 
speech acts it is impossible either to 
logically derive value propositions, moral 
duties or obligations to act, or to present 
the idealizing suppositions of such rules 
for dialogical situations as would ensure 
the production of universal norms for 
participants in a conversation. The use of 
language itself has normative features 
only when the speaker at the same time 
commits to take the promise seriously 
(Huotari, 2003). 
According to Searle (1969, 1979, 1999), 
certain rules affecting the use of language 
are such by nature that they constitute 
acts, i.e. facts that also appear in 
intentional behaviour. The starting point 
is that the speech act is a lingual act whose 
purpose is to accomplish an impact—
when saying something, the speaker also 
does something (Huotari, 2003). 
Searle (1969, 1979) emphasizes the 
situationality of speech acts in his theory 
(cf. Austin, 1962). Depending on the 
context, the speech act might have 
different communicative meanings 
defined by the agreements and rules 
prevailing in the institutional context in 
question. The meaning is established on 
the basis of the constitutive rule “X counts 
Y in context C”. Thus it constitutes an 
institutional fact, whose existence 
presupposes the existence of certain 
human institutions1 (Huotari, 2003). 
Searle (1969, 1979, 1999) has 
endeavoured to explain how the speech 
act of promising creates a moral 
obligation. The main idea can be 
crystallized into the following deductive 
argument: 
 
1. The evaluator expresses the 
thought “I will follow the action 
plan.” 
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2. The evaluator promised to follow 
the action plan. 
3. The evaluator set himself / herself 
a duty to follow the action plan. 
4. The evaluator has a duty to follow 
the action plan. 
5. The evaluator must follow the 
action plan. 
 
According to Searle (1969, 1979, 1999), 
the speech act of promising presented in 
sentence (1) is an institutional fact 
pertaining to a certain institutional 
context, from which it is possible to 
logically derive an obligation to act, the 
value proposition (1). “…in making the 
utterance, the speaker commits himself to 
acting in such a way so that his future 
behaviour will come to match the 
prepositional content of the utterance” 
(Searle, 1999, 2008, p. 175).2 
Could it be thought that the actor, 
when promising to follow the action plan, 
in fact creates a moral duty for herself / 
himself to do that? However, Mackie 
(1977) has argued that it is not possible to 
derive a moral duty in the way Searle 
proposes. The institutional facts are not 
ordinary facts. It is possible to derive a 
value proposition from sentence (1) only if 
the promise already contains the duty to 
follow the rule; the uttering of the promise 
constitutes an obligation only when the 
speaker at the same time commits to take 
the promise seriously. It is possible to 
speak about duties without making them 
one’s moral burden. The promise given 
earnestly is quite a different matter than 
the mention of a promise (Airaksinen, 
1993; Huotari, 2003; Mackie, 1977). 
It seems impossible to attempt to 
logically derive an obligation to act from 
speech acts. The above attempt, however, 
makes it clear that the concept of 
commitment should be an essential theme 
of ethical reflection in evaluation. 
The emphasis of the speech act theory 
on the illocutionary force of utterances, 
i.e. on the notion that in saying something 
the speaker also does something, is 
regarded as fruitful by Habermas, too. His 
definition of illocutionary force follows 
from this view: illocutionary force consists 
of a speech act’s capacity to motivate the 
hearer to act on the premise that the 
commitment signalled by the speaker is 
seriously meant (Cooke, 1998). 
In his theory Habermas (1981, 1983) 
attempts to reconstruct the universal 
competencies that are involved when 
social actors interact with the aim of 
achieving mutual understanding 
(‘Verständigung’). By applying his social 
theory it is possible to seek ways of 
creating consensus by so-called 
communicative action. The attempt to 
achieve mutual understanding in a 
discussion may help to define those moral 
norms which enable one to assume that 
the consequences and side-effects caused 
by the common observance of those rules 
for anyone’s private interests are, taking 
into account the effects of known 
alternative means of regulation, 
acceptable to all the persons concerned 
(Huotari, 2003). 
Habermas presents certain idealising 
suppositions to guide this process of 
argumentation: openness to the public, 
inclusiveness, equal rights of 
participation, immunisation against 
external or inherent compulsion, and 
orientation of the participants towards 
reaching an understanding (i.e. the 
sincere expression of utterances). 
Furthermore, the statements uttered must 
be true, the speakers must believe in their 
own arguments, and any linguistically 
argued positions must have jointly 
accepted justification (Alexy, 1978; 
Habermas, 1983, 1998b). 
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However, it is stated that the mutual 
understanding achieved by 
communication can be local only Lyotard, 
1985). Also, there is good reason to ask 
whether the exact rules set to the nature 
of speech situations are not too idealistic 
and whether the universalism does not 
hide part of its own ideals: freedom, self-
realisation, and creativity. Furthermore, it 
is not self-evident that the participants of 
communication will actually choose the 
orientation towards reaching 
understanding as their goal and refrain 
from using power (Huotari, 2003). 
To what extent is it actually possible 
for an actor in his/her occupational role to 
use language communicatively, with the 
aim of achieving mutual understanding 
(communicative action), instead of being 
oriented towards the consequences 
(strategic action)?3 (Habermas, 1998a, 
1998c) This is a very interesting question 
indeed, for it is reasonable to think that in 
the evaluation process the action of the 
professional is governed above all by 
professional goals. The action can be 
described here as the realisation of a plan 
that relies above all on the actor’s 
interpretation of the situation. Here the 
linguistic communication is subordinated 
to the prerequisites of purposive-rational 
action. The essential question here is to 
what extent the actors who are 
professionally committed to strategic 
action can also commit to the 
communicative use of language, in which 
“the participating actors must conduct 
themselves cooperatively and attempt to 
harmonise their plans with one another 
(within the horizon of a shared lifeworld) 
on the basis of common (or sufficiently 
overlapping) interpretations of the 
situation” (Habermas, 1998d, p. 299). 
This criticism does not prevent one 
from thinking, however, that the 
argumentation process is fruitful 
expressly when the participants can set 
mutual understanding as a goal and 
commit to aspire to that goal—although it 
will be impossible to reach it perfectly in 
practice. Normatively it is possible to set 
inevitable but general conditions for such 
communicative everyday practice and 
discursive will-formation as might place 
the persons concerned in a situation in 
which they were able, on their own 
initiative and according to their own 
needs and views, to realize some concrete 
opportunities for a better and safer life 
(Habermas, 1985; Huotari, 2003). 
 
Ethical Decision-Making and 
Virtues 
 
In the evaluation process, it is not only the 
organising of different views and action 
plans so as to reach the mutual 
understanding that advances evaluation 
utilization through argumentation. It is 
above all complicated to compose a 
framework that can ensure clear 
guidelines for ethical evaluation practice 
in specific contextual situations and in 
complex operational environment with 
conflicting role expectations. In the 
governmental evaluation markets, the 
evaluators are acting in a complex 
operational environment where they have 
to take on various roles, including those of 
a consultant/administrator, a data 
collector/researcher, a reporter, a 
member of the evaluation profession, a 
member of the same professional network 
as the object of evaluation, and a member 
of society. The complexity of assuming 
these several roles and meeting their 
demands frequently creates conflicts for 
the evaluator and results in ethical 
dilemmas—situations involving choices 
between equally unsatisfactory 
alternatives. The practical morality of 
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evaluators has to do with making choices 
among conflicting values and principles 
(e.g., Huotari, 2009; Newman & Brown, 
1996). 
As Newman and Brown (1996) has 
depicted the standards and ethical codes 
are useful but will always be insufficient in 
themselves as guidelines for ethical 
practice when rules conflict and when 
specific contextual situations demand 
unique responses. They also maintain that 
ethical theories, categorized on the basis 
of five criteria, have their strengths and 




Strengths and Weaknesses of Ethical Theories 
 
Criterion Strengths Weaknesses 
Consequences 
Facilitates calculating the outcomes 
and making comparisons 
Focuses on outcomes 
Congruent with traditional outcome-
oriented evaluation 
Difficult to assess effects on everyone affected 
May result in restricting someone’s rights 
Difficult to define what is good and whose goods 
take the priority 
Duty 
Provides a clear picture of expectations 
Takes contractual and professional 
relationships into consideration 
May overemphasise managerial perspectives 
May neglect the needs of the stakeholders 
Rights 
Provides minimal protection for 
individuals 
Separates behavioural standards from 
the outcomes 
May fail to consider social justice issues 
Rights are not absolute and they may conflict 
Social justice Ensures that goods are allocated fairly 
May emphasise entitlement at the expense of 
effort/creativity 
May restrict some stakeholder rights 
Changes the traditional role of the evaluator 
from a neutral observer to an advocate 
Ethics of care 
Takes specific contexts into account 
Examines effects on relationships 
May appear relativistic 




However, Newman and Brown’s own 
framework, with the emphasis of five 
principles, has its own weaknesses to take 
in account the multiple perspectives at the 
same time (Huotari, 2003).  Newman and 
Brown (1996) recommend that ethical 
decision-making should involve the 
application of five principles—autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and 
fidelity—that “are broader than specific 
rules, and they provide helpful, although 
not absolute, guidance when rules conflict 
and when specific contextual situations 
demand unique responses” (Newman & 
Brown, 1996, p. 191). 
  
 Autonomy includes the right to act 
freely, make free choices and think 
as one wish. The principle of 
autonomy is not just a right, but 
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also an obligation. As individual 
persons, we have the right to 
autonomy, but at the same time we 
have the obligation to respect the 
autonomous rights of the others 
(Newman & Brown, 1996). 
 Nonmaleficence (doing no harm) is 
the duty not to incur evil or undue 
harm (Newman & Brown, 1996). 
 Beneficence, benefiting others  
(Newman & Brown, 1996). 
 Justice, being just means being 
fair, equitable and impartial. It 
means responding to, reacting to, 
and making decisions about people 
independent of their race, gender, 
socio-economic status or other 
inappropriate attributes. Being just 
also implies responding to people 
in a manner they deserve (Newman 
& Brown, 1996). 
 Fidelity means being faithful. It 
implies keeping promises, being 
loyal and being honest. Veracity 
could be discussed as a separate 
principle, but Newman and Brown 
find it helpful to include it in the 
principle of fidelity (Newman & 
Brown, 1996). 
 
These five principles play a key role in 
Newman and Brown’s (1996) flowchart 
(see Table 2), which is meant as a 
heuristic tool for ethical decision-making 
in program evaluation. The starting point 
is an intuitive feeling of potential ethical 
conflict, followed by an attempt to find 
out whether there is a specific rule that 
suits the situation. If necessary, one then 
conducts an analysis on the basis of 
ethical principles and criteria (theories), 
and reflects on the solution with respect to 






The Decision-Making Flowchart 
 
Level 1: Intuitive sense of a potential ethical conflict 
Questions: Do I respond to my intuitive concerns? Do I have time for further analysis? 
Decision 1: Stop or pursue concern analysis (move to level 2). 
Level 2: Rules 
Question: What rule, standard or code applies? 
Decision 2: Does a rule, standard or code apply? If not, stop or go to Level 3. 
Decision 3: If a rule, standard or code fits your situation, take action (Level 5) or move to level 3 
for further analysis or stop. 
Level 3: Principles and theories 
Systematic examination of the relevance of each principle (autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, justice, fidelity) 
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1. Questions you might ask yourself: Autonomy: Are anyone’s rights affected? Is the client 
attempting to restrict your right to collect appropriate information or to write the report you 
believe is appropriate? Do you respect the rights of the program participants to privacy? 
Nonmaleficence: What undue harm is likely to occur as a result of the decision and action? Is one’s 
reputation or job at risk? Will program staff be exposed to excessive stress because of the 
evaluation process? Will program participants be exposed to undue harm through violation of 
privacy or through program ineffectiveness if improvements are not made in the program? 
Beneficence: What good can come to clients and participants through evaluation? Is the maximum 
good being achieved? What good can be accomplished beyond the expectations of professional 
codes and rules? Justice: What issues are related to fairness and accuracy in this evaluation? Are 
multiple perspectives being gathered? Fidelity: What contractual arrangements have been made? 
Do you have unique obligations as an evaluator because of your role in the evaluation or within the 
evaluation context? Do the program participants expect you to be their advocate? 
2. What is the relevance of each principle (autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, 
fidelity)? If principles conflict with each other in your evaluation context, how might they be 
balanced? Examination of the relevance of the criteria derived from ethical theory. How do the 
criteria (consequences, duty, rights, social justice and ethics of care) apply? (What are the possible 
consequences? Are there any special obligations or duties involved? How is your role perceived 
and how do these expectations match up with your own perception of your role? Are anyone’s 
rights affected? Are participants’ rights to privacy involved? Is social justice being served? Are you, 
for example, considering the needs and interests of the less powerful or less influential? What is 
unique about the context that may affect the consequences? How will a decision affect 
relationships among persons within this context?) 
Decision 4: Stop, consider values (Level 4), or take action (Level 5)? 
Level 4: Personal values 
Questions: How do my personal values, visions and beliefs affect my thinking? What kind of a 
person do I want to be?  
Decision 5: Stop or take action (Level 5)? 
Level 5. Action 
Questions: How much stress is involved? What are the risks to me? What are the risks to others? 
What do my colleagues think? What is my plan of action? How will the organization react to this 
plan? What cultural perspectives are important to consider? How did my action resolve the issue? 
Decision 6: Stop or implement an action plan? 
Decision 7: Has the plan worked or must I start again? 
 
 
It needs to be noted, however, that the 
principles (autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, justice, and fidelity) may 
conflict with each other. From whose 
point of view, then, are the actions more 
just, more beneficial, or more faithful? 
When should one give preference to 
professional autonomy over fidelity or 
beneficence? In what situations are the 
choices seriously affected by the 
evaluator’s own beliefs and values? The 
solutions offered by different moral 
theories may also lead to conflicting value 
judgements, which is a serious problem. 
However, the criteria can be differentially 
emphasized and the evaluator’s personal 
ethics play an important role in this 
process. When the different criteria 
applied to the situation do not conflict, it 
is possible to get a diversified view 
(Airaksinen, 1993; Huotari, 2003). 
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The different definitions and theories 
are useful in their own places and 
functions. By analysing matters from 
many viewpoints, without commitment to 
one single moral concept system, it is 
possible to try to avoid the problems of 
moral consideration: no one ethical 
framework is strong enough to resolve the 
issue alone (Airaksinen, 1993; Huotari, 
2003). 
The flowchart outlined by Newman 
and Brown (1996) is an explicitly heuristic 
tool—it does not give ready-made 
solutions but leaves room for personal 
ethics. Maybe this is the main advantage 
of the model: it helps us to understand 
that it is necessary to develop our 
personal ethical reflection. The model also 
helps us to realize that personal ethics is 
mostly concerned with balancing the 
conflicting principles and values. Newman 
and Brown (1996) think that making 
ethical choices is a cognitive process—
even though it involves personal values—
and can be enhanced through thinking, 
reading, discussion, and practice. They 
also think that being ethical is more than 
just making good ethical decisions 
regarding isolated incidents or situations: 
  
Being an ethical evaluator is a professional 
way of life and, ultimately, a personal way 
of life. Like any way of life, it does not 
remove conflict and stress, and it does not 
provide a rulebook answer to all 
dilemmas. Rather, being ethical represents 
the perspective we take on the tasks we 
face, the process we use to confront issues, 
and the guides we use to make decisions 
(Newman & Brown, 1996, p. 192). 
 
In this context, they also emphasize 
some professional virtues: 
 
Being ethical also takes something we 
probably have not addressed enough in 
this book, and that is courage. That 
courage, on occasion, demands resistance; 
on other occasions it demands 
persistence; and on other occasions it may 
even demand assertiveness. While 
fostering courage, however, we have to 
avoid being self-righteous. Courage must 
be coupled with the humble acceptance 
that we will not always make the best 
decision or the best choice, but we will 
keep trying, and we trust our colleagues 
and clients will help us by providing 
constructive criticisms (Newman & 
Brown, 1996, p. 192). 
 
What are the essential professional 
virtues of evaluator? This interesting 
theme can be studied by applying 
MacIntyre’s (1985) definition of virtue. 
According to MacIntyre, virtue is an 
acquired human quality such that 
possessing and using it enables one to 
reach such good things as have an inner 
relation to the practice and lacking it 
prevents one even from gaining any 
corresponding value. 
Following MacIntyre’s theory for 
example the professional virtues of 
management consultants can be 
generated on three different level or 
contexts that are (1) a personal life story 
of a management consultant, (2) the 
practice of consulting, and (3) the moral 
inheritance and ethical discourse of the 
consultants’ professional society. In his 
analysis af Ursin (2007) found ten 
different professional virtues for 
management consultant: the identity of 
management consultant, independence, 
objectivity, disinterestedness, loyalty to 
the agreement with a client, competence-
aware flexibility, helpfulness, process 
reticence, trustworthiness, and integrity 
with a client. 
In order to outline particularly 
evaluator’s professional virtues it is 
possible to supplement this approach by a 
model (Laitinen, 2002, 2008; Virtanen & 
Laitinen, 2004) that outlines the ethical 
perspectives of which an evaluator is 
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morally responsible (see Figure 2). Using 
this framework, the activity of the 
evaluator can be examined balancing the 
value dimensions; the ideal is that the 
activity can be approved in terms of (a) 
scientific veracity, (b) methodological 
mastery and competence, (c) the integrity 
of the object of evaluation, and (d) social 
responsibility and usefulness of 
evaluation (Huotari 2009; Laitinen, 
2008). From this perspective, we can ask, 
what are the professional virtues that 
make it possible to fulfill the challenges of 













It must be, however noticed, that 
MacIntyre’s reasoning needs the support 
of a view that our social reality contains 
enough such extensive and significant 
ways of life and life plans as depend on 
acquired qualities, i.e. virtues, for their 
realization. This granted, life then consists 
of a number of social institutions and a 
number of virtues required for the 
effective functioning of those institutions 
(Airaksinen, 1993; Huotari, 2003). 
Human beings are splendid and their 
life is good when they internally 
participate in social activities. It seems, 
however, that the problem of modern man 
precisely is that he/she doesn’t know 
his/her own goals but drifts from 
situation to situation, tossed by external 
forces and pressures. An essential 
question in virtue ethics is therefore: Does 
the meaning of human life provide us with 
any integrated whole from which virtues 
can be derived, or are there only specific 
tasks and relationships where people can 
shine (Airaksinen, 1993; Huotari, 2003)? 
This raises many interesting questions 
concerning professional virtues: What is 
the vision that ought to guide and 
organize occupational activity? What sorts 
of acquired human qualities, or virtues, 
does the realisation of the goal require of 
the evaluator? To what extent can an 
evaluator base his/her action in his/her 
occupational role on motives that consist 
mainly of reputation, status, and money, 
rather than the goal itself, with an inner 
relationship between the means and the 
goal? 
It seems that the identification and 
acquirement of professional virtues that 
make it possible to balance the essential 
value dimensions is an essential element 
in evaluator’s professional reflection. 
Furthermore, it is an interesting and 
important theme for further empirical 
research on the ethics of evaluation.  
Conclusions 
 
In this article, the complex nature of 
evaluation practice in multiactor networks 
is the starting point of the sketching of 
guidelines for ethical reflection. To this 
end, we have considered different 
approaches, which have their strong and 
weak points. Communication can be seen 
as an essential element in evaluation 
process. However, it seems that from 
speech acts it is impossible either to 
logically derive value propositions, moral 
duties or obligations to act, or to present 
idealizing suppositions of such rules for 
dialogical situations as would ensure the 
production of universal norms for 
participants in a conversation. Still, 
normatively it is possible to set inevitable 
but general conditions for such 
communicative everyday practice and 
discursive will-formation as might place 
the persons concerned in a situation in 
which they were able, on their own 
initiative and according to their own 
needs and views, to realize some concrete 
opportunities for a better and safer life 
(Habermas, 1985). Thus it seems, the 
argumentation process is fruitful 
expressly when the participants can set 
mutual understanding as a goal and 
commit to aspire to that goal—although it 
will be impossible to reach it perfectly in 
practice. 
The use of neither extensive principles 
nor reflection on several theories can 
ensure a clear view of the situation. The 
ethics of evaluation is mostly concerned 
with balancing the conflicting principles 
and values. In order to face this challenge 
we need to commit ourselves to 
developing our skills in identifying, 
analyzing and solving the ethical 
problems and dilemmas. In this reflective, 
professional way of life—that neither 
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removes conflict and stress nor provides a 
rulebook answer to all dilemmas—we also 
need to commit ourselves to the 
identification and acquirement of 
professional virtues that make it possible 
to balance the essential value dimensions 




1. Searle’s (1969) distinction between 
hard facts and institutional facts is 
based on the so-called theory of the 
philosophy of ordinary language 
inspired by Wittgenstein’s late 
philosophy. In this trend of analytical 
philosophy, the focus is on how people 
use language in their daily life and on 
what kinds of criteria they base their 
use. 
2. According to Searle (1969, 1979) each 
type of illocution has an illocutionary 
point, a point or purpose which is 
internal to its being an act of that type: 
for example, the point of promises is to 
commit the speaker to doing 
something.  “By saying that the 
illocutionary point is internal to the 
type of illocutionary act, we mean 
simply that a successful performance 
of an act of that type necessarily 
achieves that purpose and it achieves it 
in virtue of being an act of that type. It 
could not be a successful act of that 
type if it did not achieve that purpose. 
In real life a person may have all sorts 
of other purposes and aims; e.g. in 
making a promise, he may want to 
reassure his hearer, keep the 
conversation going, or try to appear 
clever, and none of these is part of the 
essence of promising. But when he 
makes a promise he necessarily 
commits himself to doing something, 
because that is the illocutionary point 
of the illocutionary act of 
promising…The illocutionary point of 
a promise to do act A is to commit the 
speaker to doing A” (Searle & 
Vanderveken, 1985, p. 14). 
3. Communicative action can be 
distinguished from strategic action in 
the following respect: the successful 
coordination of action does not rely on 
the purposive rationality of the 
respective individual’s plans of action 
but rather on the rationally motivating 
power of feats of reaching 
understanding, that is, on rationality 
that manifests itself in the conditions 
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